Kameraad Mhambi

There was not one single reason that South Africa decided to invade Angola and kick off the so-called Grensoorlog. There were a number.

Some historians have suggested that a series of escalating incidents drew the South Africans into the conflict. But this ignores that there were some over arching South African goals and one of them in particular – Afrikaner acceptance – swung Vorster into action.

The Swapo insurgency

South Africa had, since the first operation against Plan insurgents at Ongulumbashe in May 1966, been fighting a guerrilla war against Swapo. Swapo who formed in the 1950′s, was a typical black Nationalist movement fighthing for independence. In its case fighting for independence for South West Africa from South Africa.

It operated from Zambia via Angola. Importantly, one of the rebel groups battling the Portuguese in Angola, Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA, provided Swapo with sanctuary and support.

Unlike the ANC who had hardly attempted and failed in executing successful military incursions into South Africa, Swapo’s PLAN did it with increasing regularity and even sometimes successfully hit targets.

This was even more impressive in that Swapo managed their attacks while the Portuguese were still in control of Angola. The South African concern was that a black Angolan regime would only strengthen Swapo’s hand.

Calueque

On top of this South Africa had invested hundreds of millions of Rands into the building the Calueque hydro electric dam, a few kilometers into the Angolan border. The project had just been completed, but it was already supplying electricity to most of the Northern part of South West Africa. As the Portuguese commenced pulling out, South Africa sent troops to protect it.

A battle for infuence and oil

Both Russia, China and the US had long already backed two pro independence groups in Angola. The stakes were higher than for many other African countries, Angola it was thought was rich in minerals and had proven oil reserves.

The Russian’s backed the oldest movement, the MPLA. It was a Marxist liberation movement centered around the capital in Luanda, and as such had an intellectual base and included a number of mixed race Angolans.

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Both the Chinese and US had backed Holden Roberto’s FNLA, an movement with an ethnic support base in the Bakongo people found in the North of the country and in the then Zaire.

Jonas Savimbi, broke with the FNLA to create UNITA. UNITA was an ‘Africanist’ party emphasizing ethnic and rural rights in distinction to the urbanized Marxism of the ruling MPLA, but in reality represented one group: Ovimbundu. The Ovimbundu who lived in the center and South of the country was the largest ethnic group in Angola.

Both the US and China tried to court UNITA, both supplying weapons and funds.

Each of the three liberation movements had signed a peace agreement with Portugal recognizing that November 11 1975 would be Angola’s independence day. With Portugal out of the picture, the liberation movements turned on each other, fighting for control of Luanda and international recognition.

The MPLA was in pole position. And through further military successes, backed up by Soviet help, it was gaining ground.

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was due to meet in November 1975 to clarify the situation. At this meeting Africa would accept and legitimise one of the rebel groups as the government of Angola.

It was in this environment that the US approached Pretoria to provide training and weapons to the FNLA and UNITA who had agreed to form a pact against the MPLA. They were due to attack the capital in a grand pincer movement from the North and South.

From a South Africa perspective such a pact backed by themselves would remove UNITA as a key Swapo ally.

But there was a more important consideration to Vorster.

Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko who was allied to the FNLA and underwritten by the US and Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda, who supported Savimbi, were also in on the deal. They were pressing for action. Vorster agreed.

Operation Savanna

And the plan? The plan was to ensure that the FNLA and UNITA not only became the de facto government in their territories, but to threaten Luanda so, that the OAU would be forced to recognise all three movements in a government of national unity.

To do this, the SADF decided to ship both canons and an artillery crew to the North of Angola via Cabinda, in order to support the FNLA. But at the same time also to invade with a strike force via the South. It was to push towards Luanda.

Is it the sumtotal of the factors mentioned above that swung Vorster in favour of war? Yes, but there was to his mind yet another more important opportunity.

Vorster had for some time tried desperately to woe African leaders like Kaunda. To him the key to Afrikaners survival in Africa was acceptance by Africa. He hoped to achieve thus through leaders like Kaunda.

It was for this reason that he gave up on Rhodesia’s Ian Smith. Vorster, virulently anti-British, was willing to sacrifice white Rhodesia – who he did not consider African – to save Afrikanerdom.

It was a chance for Afrikaners not to be seen as colonialists Vorster thought. He pointedly told his head of the army, General Constand Viljoen, that if Africa asks them to do something for them, then South Africa can’t say no.

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Related deployments:

1. Ikonoklasta and the rumbles in Angola
2. Grensoorlog – a war against Communism?